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In this paper I discuss the factors that go into the interpretation 
of musical works in performance. My comments are restricted to 
works specifi ed by standard musical notations and intended for 
live performance on more or less orthodox musical instruments, 
and I assume that the performer sincerely intends to play the 
composer’s work rather than, for example, using it as the launch-
ing pad for an improvised fantasia. I also suppose that the per-
former is not the composer and the composer is not available to 
be consulted.
First, fi nd your work
To perform and thereby interpret the composer’s work, the mu-
sician must fi rst locate it, so to speak. Composers communicate 
their works via sets of instructions addressed to performers. To 
fi nd the work, one must understand the work-identifying instruc-
tions. Doing so requires a considerable amount of knowledge and 
experience.
To begin, one must know what is unmentioned because it is 
assumed by the composer as knowledge shared in common with 
the musicians who are to perform his work. The composer does 
not (usually) include among the work’s specifi cations instructions 
about how the instruments are to be built and played. When he 
indicates something for the violinist to do, he takes for granted 
that her instrument is appropriately constructed, that it is tuned 
in the standard fashion, and that she is familiar with and suitably 
skilled in the performance practice associated with the instru-
ment. That way he can indicate ‘Achieve this on a violin’ and trust 
to the performer to know how to execute the instruction. It is 
only if something non-standard is required in the method of play-
ing, scordatura tunings, mutes, playing with the wood of the bow, 
that an explicit instruction is needed.
If the music is old, it may not be easy to know what in per-
formance is necessary, tolerable, idiomatic, sophisticated, subtle, 
coarse but possible, idiosyncratic yet acceptable, standard but 
mundane, and so on. In extreme cases, we might not know what 
instruments are to be used or be sure how they are to be played.
In the Western classical tradition, we have a fairly secure knowl-
edge of the performance practice that goes with church and court 
music of the past four hundred or more years, which is not to deny 
that there is controversy over many of the details. Even so, com-
placency would be misplaced. Recordings make us aware how 
much performance norms (and musical tastes) have altered over 
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only the past one hundred years, yet these changes were gradual 
and largely unremarked by the musicians who perpetuated them. 
The player is at risk, then, of mistaking current performance prac-
tices for accurate representations of the traditions in which the 
pieces she plays found their homes. She is also in danger of con-
fusing modern equivalents of musical instruments for their pre-
decessors  – the clarinet for the basset horn, the Böhm clarinet for 
the one for which Weber wrote, the pianoforte for the fortepiano, 
the modern cello for the ancestor that lacked a sound bar, high 
bridge, endpin, metal strings, sustaining bow, and so forth.
Someone might ask: why should we feel obliged to interpret 
the work according to outmoded performance practices and on 
antique forms of instruments? I agree that this question deserves 
to be taken seriously. But it is one thing to ask sophisticated ques-
tions about our interpretative options once we have located the 
work we are trying to perform and quite another to misidentify 
that work out of ignorance. It is the latter I am warning against 
here. The player might decide later that she is justifi ed in depart-
ing from the performance practice or instrumentation in which 
her target work had its genesis, but fi rst she must be sure to fi nd 
the work she represents herself as giving.
As well as taking for granted the performance practice of his 
time, the composer also adopts the notational conventions of the 
day when he records his work-determinative instructions. The 
score does not usually spell out the vocabulary of signs and the 
grammar it employs, because it is addressed to musicians who are 
supposed to be already literate in the notation. The musician has 
to know notational rules, such as that an accidental applies to all 
notes of the given pitch in a measure until otherwise cancelled, 
or that a dot above or below a note indicates that it is to be played 
staccato. She also needs to know how the performance practice 
affects the reading of the notation, so that, for instance, some 
rhythms are to be double-dotted, the melody is to be decorated 
when it is repeated, and a cadenza is to be interpolated where a 
caesura is written.
As just indicated, not everything that is notated is to be read 
literally. Neither is every notational indication work determinat-
ive. Scores can contain suggestions or recommendations, for 
example, regarding fi ngerings, pedaling, or cadenzas that the 
performance practice treats as falling within the performer’s pre-
rogative. Sometimes scores specify alternatives (e.g., ossia) or in-
dicate note types rather than the tokens that will be played (e.g., 
fi gured bass).
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We have a fairly secure knowledge of the notational practices 
of the West of the past four hundred or more years, which is not 
to deny that there is controversy over many of the details. Never-
theless, musicians are at risk of mistaking current notational prac-
tices for accurate representations of the traditions in which the 
original score was created. Pierre Monteux, who (in 1949) wanted 
to give an absolutely authentic performance of the fi fth Bran-
denburg concerto, apparently remonstrated with the continuo 
player, Putnam Aldrich, ‘What are those chords you’re playing? 
Bach wrote no chords here! ... If Bach wanted chords he would 
have written chords. This is to be an authentic performance. We 
shall play only what Bach wrote!’ (Troeger 2003, p. 218).
The musician also needs an accurate copy of the composer’s 
notation or, if she works from an editor’s modern performance 
version in which there has been a ‘translation’ (and probably also 
an expansion of detail) into current notation, a clear account of 
what was indicated by the composer and what added or amended 
by the editor. What is crucial is not that a single Urtext exists, but 
that relevant differences between various sources or versions are 
shown as such, along with a footnoting of their sources, reliabil-
ity, plausibility, and so on.
Suppose all these initial conditions are met. As a result, the 
musician has located the composer’s work and identifi ed what is 
required in delivering it faithfully. Already the fi rst acts of inter-
pretation have been completed; namely, those involved in inter-
preting (reading) the score in the light of appropriate notational 
conventions and relevant performance practices. What comes 
next?
Whose interpretation is to be given?
A fi rst question asks who is to do the interpreting. In a string 
quartet, the group might share in the task of generating the inter-
pretation, and hopefully they coordinate their efforts so that the 
interpretation produced is internally consistent. More often, one 
person takes overall responsibility. Where there is a conductor, 
she has the job of shaping the performance’s interpretation (pro-
vided there is the usual time for rehearsal and explanation). But 
conductors mainly control pace, balance, expressive highlights, 
and dynamics. Important though these are, they leave many sub-
tleties of attack, phrasing, and the rest for the interpretation of 
the individual musicians (or section leaders). 
For the sake of simplicity, assume the work is for a single play-
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1 That commitment was assumed 
in this discussion as an initial premise. 
If it does not obtain, the story will be 
different. But whatever new story is 
appropriate, it could not be one about 
the performance of the composer’s piece 
as such.
er, who then will also be its interpreter. She might continue to 
ask whose interpretation is to be used, if her goal is to emulate 
some great player of the past. Will she ape Brendel or Rubin-
stein, copy Du Pré or Rostropovitch? But again to avoid irrelevant 
complications, let it be the case that she intends to offer her own 
interpretation.
Authenticity and interpretation
A crucial choice for this stage is one about the degree of authen-
ticity that will be pursued in the performance. I am reluctant to 
call this an interpretative decision, having previously written 
that authenticity is an ontological requirement, not an interpre-
tative option (Davies 2001, p. 207). This principle is entailed by 
the performer’s commitment to playing the composer’s work.1 
To play the work, she must, at the minimum, follow suffi cient 
of the composer’s work-determinative instructions to make the 
work recognizable in her performance. Deliberately and system-
atically to disregard the majority of those instructions is to fail to 
perform the work in question, not to interpret it. 
Also, it is well to bear in mind that faithfully following all of 
the composer’s public, work-determinative instructions leaves 
open the possibility of many different interpretations, including 
ones offering contrasting, even opposed, visions, of the piece. 
Not all authentic performances are good ones, or provide a con-
vincing account of the work, but even among those that are very 
good there can be great variety and disagreement. This is because 
the work-determinative instructions underdetermine much of 
what goes into any actual performance, including the conception 
of its overall organization. Even where the tradition allows the 
composer to be as explicit and detailed in specifying his work 
as is Mahler, for example, considerable interpretative freedom 
remains to the performer.
Nevertheless, works can survive in performances that acci-
dentally or deliberately mistreat them. And there can be good 
reasons for aiming at a degree of authenticity that falls short of 
what is ideally possible, simply, it can be too diffi cult, or incon-
venient, or aesthetically unattractive, given the circumstances of 
performance.
Only prissy puritans could hold that inauthenticity in musical 
performance is always egregious. It is disappointing, therefore, 
that so many musicians spuriously claim authenticity for their 
performances, and thereby distort what is meant by that useful 
NET 33 Text.indd   12 07-02-14   12.07.26
13performance interpretations of musical works
2 Here I differ from Levinson. (1996, 
p. 63), who requires in his defi nition 
of performance interpretations that 
they have been considered, by which 
I take him to mean that the performer 
who gives the interpretation must have 
thought about it in advance.
and important notion. They say their performances are authentic 
because through them they express their heartfelt feelings, or be-
cause the composer would have wanted his work done as they do 
it if only he could have lived to the present, or because they seek 
out the spirit of the music rather than mechanically following 
the letter of the score. It would be better, more honest anyway, 
were they to admit that they have chosen to ignore some of the 
composer’s work-determinative indications, or to make changes 
in what would usually be work-determinative features in pieces 
of the kind in question. If we would admit to performing the 
Prague version of 1787 as against the Vienna one of 1788, why 
not also allow, if appropriate, that we are giving the slightly re-
modeled version of 2006?
Any performance in which the work remains recognizable 
could be said to meet the minimum standard for its authentic 
performance. Because musical works can be recognized in per-
formances in which they are seriously abused, a competent musi-
cian who targeted only the minimum would have to deliberately 
play wrongly many notes she could easily play correctly. Com-
petent musicians, to be accepted as such, must aim higher than 
the minimum, then. But there is a considerable gap between the 
minimum and the ideal, and settling for something less than the 
ideal typically will take the performer far past the minimum. The 
performer can (and often does) choose to aim lower than the ideal 
in pursuing authenticity in her performance. And her choices in 
this regard may turn out to be relevant to the interpretation she 
offers. For instance, if she chooses to play on the pianoforte a 
work clearly indicated as for the harpsichord, she will not be able 
to exploit the interpretative possibilities offered by stops, octave 
couplings, and multiple keyboards, but she may be able to give 
the piece a weightier and perhaps therefore a more noble charac-
ter than would be possible on most harpsichords.
What is interpretation through performance?
How is a performance interpretation to be characterized? I sug-
gest the following: the performance interpretation of a work, W, 
is the overall expressive and structural vision of W that emerges 
from W’s complete performance.2 A given interpretation can be 
repeated in different performances, including ones by different 
performers. (So, interpretations are performance types that can 
have multiple tokens.) And a given performer can offer distinct 
interpretations of the same work on different occasions.
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3 For further discussion of the na-
ture of and conditions on performance, 
see Thom 1993, Godlovitch 1998, and 
Davies 2001, ch. 4.
I claim that a vision of the work emerges from every perform-
ance, and hence that every performance embodies an interpre-
tation. Some of these interpretations will be inchoate and silly, 
however. In other words, as I use it, ‘to interpret’ is not a suc-
cess-entailing verb. (In this it is unlike, ‘to marry’, to take one ex-
ample.) Also, the vision that emerges is not always projected or 
even intended by the performer; performance interpretations are 
not necessarily intended by the people who make them, as I now 
explain. 
Performance necessarily is intentional, but not always to the 
highest level. In other words, work performance requires the 
low-level intention to follow some set of work-determinative in-
structions, but need not depend on the high-level intention to 
play a given work by a given composer, because the high-level 
intention can be defeated though a performance takes place. 
This is what happens when musicians intending to play a trum-
pet voluntary by Purcell end up performing a piece by Jeremiah 
Clarke.3 Interpretation also is intentional at the low but not 
necess arily the high level. Interpretational choices are inescap-
ably involved in the most basic performance decisions regarding 
what and how to play. To play the notes at all, the performer 
must settle issues of attack, decay, dynamics, vibrato, phrasing, 
balance, melodic nuance, intonation, harmonic texture, timbre, 
rhythmic infl ection, etcetera, all at a level of subtlety that goes 
beyond what is determinatively instructed, with the result that 
interpretation penetrates to the deepest, most elemental level of 
the performance. But on the other hand, the performer might 
make these decisions in real time, without prior consideration 
or concern for the total effect. She might play in the moment, 
leaving the overall vision to emerge as it will. If she does so, the 
interpretation that is generated derives from her intentional acts 
but is not intended by her as such. When that happens, she can-
not take credit for the overall expressive and structural vision 
of the work present in the complete performance, and, at the 
same time, she may leave herself open to criticism concerning 
the performance’s interpretative failings, given that musicians 
ought to plan for and interest themselves in the interpretations 
that result from their performances.
For the sake of this discussion, suppose that the player does 
calculate and consider the accumulative effect of her local deci-
sions on the view presented of the work through its complete 
performance, as well as focusing on what she will do in the mo-
ment. The interpretation projected in her performance will be 
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intended and owned by her in the fullest sense. How she will 
shape her interpretation now will depend on how she conceives 
the raison d’être of performance interpretations. Several models 
are worth considering.
Models of interpretation
According to the fi rst, performance is equivalent to quotation, and 
the interpretation should aim to communicate the com poser’s 
‘utterance’ by repeating it with his infl ection, intention, and feel-
ing. The player subjugates herself and directs her interpretation 
to voicing the work as its composer would do. With utterances as 
complicated and multi-layered as musical works are, it remains 
likely that many different interpretations, some placing the em-
phasis here, others there, will be consistent with interpreting the 
work after this fashion. After all, when com posers conduct or 
play their own pieces on different occasions, they frequently vary 
the interpretation. The quotation model need not lead to inter-
pretational univocity. Nevertheless, this approach is more self-
 effacing and restrictive than is required.
One way the performer could inject more of herself into her 
interpretation without abandoning the quotation model is by af-
fi rming, not merely repeating, the composer’s utterance as she 
conceives it to be. If a person agrees with and asserts what she 
takes from another as she quotes it, she can make those senti-
ments expressive of her own thoughts and feelings, not merely a 
neutral report of theirs. She says ‘To thine own self be true’ and 
means it. Performers who feel a close affi nity with the character, 
mood, or attitude of a musical piece probably can personalize 
their interpretations in the way just described. They appropriate 
for themselves the signifi cance of what they quote and thereby 
express themselves (Mark 1981, Davies 2004a).
A third model accords yet more autonomy and freedom to the 
performer by comparing interpretation with translation. (Note 
that those who orally translate languages are called interpreters.) 
Translation is bound to be more creative than quotation, because 
it can succeed only by adapting what it communicates. So, com-
paring performance interpretations to translations seems like an 
improvement, because planned performance interpretations un-
deniably involve a high degree of skill, judgment, and creativity. 
Counting against the usefulness of this comparison, however, is 
the fact that translation involves adapting the original utterance 
to a different medium or language, whereas the composer and 
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performer work in the same medium, even if the composer does 
so at a more abstract level.
The models of what is involved in work interpretation that 
have been considered so far have a literary fl avor. The initial at-
tractiveness of these models lies in their capturing two central 
ideas: that the performer mediates between the composer and 
his audience and that the performer can deliver the composer’s 
work only by interpreting it. These basic intuitions seem right. 
No decent account of the sort of interpretation being discussed 
here can forget that it is the composer’s work that is interpreted, 
and that it is only through the performer’s interpretation that 
the work is delivered to its audience.4 Nevertheless, while these 
models could inform and account for some types of musical in-
terpretations, they are not perfectly apt. One diffi culty is that of 
knowing how to parse the metaphor of musical works as com-
posers’ ‘utterances’ standing in need of quotation or translation. 
And while the model of performance interpretation as quotation 
underplays the creativity brought by the musician to the act of in-
terpretation, that of interpretation as translation seems to invoke 
a kind of creativity that does not easily correspond with what the 
musician does.
Here is a new suggestion. It construes performances on the 
model of … well, performances!
Many musical works (and plays) are created for performance.5 
Among other things, this means that they are issued via instruc-
tions about what is to be done or achieved. As described earlier, 
these work specifi cations, even when conjoined with the no-
tational conventions and performance practices they take for 
granted, signifi cantly underdetermine the concrete detail of any 
actual performance. Though performers undertake the job of 
instancing the work, they must go beyond the work’s bound-
aries to do this. ‘To be or not to be’ is integral to Hamlet, but 
Shakespeare leaves to the actor decisions about the specifi c in-
fl ection, pitch, phrasing, and stress to be used. The words cannot 
be spoken without being uttered in some specifi c manner, but it 
is the words only, not the further qualities displayed whenever 
the words are spoken, that belong to the play. The melody notat-
ed on the opening pages of Beethoven’s score for his sixth sym-
phony must be shaped and articulated in every actual sounding 
of the work with a detail that goes far beyond what is notation-
ally specifi ed (or could be specifi ed in the kind of notation used). 
In consequence, its performances display many qualities that 
are not part of the work as such. Because the work can be em-
4 I assume that performances are 
made for audiences, whether actual 
or imagined, and in this differ from 
rehearsals, practice, exercises, doodling, 
and so on. Not all musical playings are 
performances. (And not all performan-
ces are of works, of course, though this 
discussion was restricted at the outset to 
those that are.) I also suppose that only 
a tiny minority of listeners can generate 
virtual performances in their minds’ 
ears simply by reading the work’s score.
5 Other musical works are comple-
tely encoded as electronically stored 
fi les and are for decoding or playback, 
not performance.
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bodied or instanced only in the performances that are of it, its 
presentations always and inevitably have a richness that it does 
not itself possess. Unlike the work, they are saturated with the 
sensuous opulence that marks everything that can be immedi-
ately perceived via the unaided senses. In its turn, the perfor-
mance depends crucially for its identity on the work it is of. An 
attempted work performance fails as a performance unless it 
presents a work. To say such works are created for performance 
is to indicate the symbiotic character of the relation between the 
work and its performances.
It is the performer who brings the work to life. She does this not 
by delivering it along with some extraneous fi ligree that comes 
as a bonus, but by producing a surface that is available to percep-
tion and within or through which the work can be apprehended. 
In other words, she speaks or acts the play or sounds the music. 
Composers and playwrights know they are licensing the per-
formers to exercise their creative talents by going beyond what 
has been specifi ed as work determinative. Their works could not 
be concretely instanced otherwise. Audiences are similarly aware 
of the importance of the performer’s contribution. Indeed, we 
sometimes recognize individual performances as ‘works of art’ 
in their own right. We acknowledge as much when we call the 
best performers artists and distinguish them from others, such as 
those who print novels or who screen movies. These latter make 
artworks available via mechanical processes, but are not perform-
ers of the works they transmit. 
Interpretation lies at the very heart of performance. Interpre-
tation penetrates every aspect of the generation of a concrete in-
stance of the work. It constructs the ground of the performance, 
the fi gure of the work, and the fashion in which the fi gure emerges 
against the ground.6 Interpretation is not something added after 
the delivery of the work has been secured. The work is bodied 
forth through acts of interpretation that infuse it with fl esh and 
breath, blood and muscle. The performer’s low- and high-level 
interpretative decisions generate the electricity needed both to 
galvanizes the work into life and to energize the ecosystem that 
sustains its being.
There is no instance of the work without a performance and 
no performance without an interpretation. Interpretation (and 
hence performance) is creative because it must go beyond what 
the composer supplies in order to bring the work alive for the per-
formance’s duration. We value (some) musical works and their 
creators, but we have no less respect and affection for (some) 
6 Whether the listener is more 
interested in the fi gure, the ground, or 
the symbiotic relation between the two 
can vary. Some works are very thin and 
the audience is liable to attend more to 
the detail of the performance. Or again, 
it may be that the work is already very 
familiar, so the focus falls on what is 
unusual about its interpretation.
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performance interpretations and for the musicians who exercise 
inventive, inspired talent in making them.
Wider contextual factors 
So far I have concentrated on the relation of the interpretation 
to the work it is of. In particular, I have described its purpose 
as the presentation of an overall vision of the work’s structure 
and expressive character. Though interpretations must be work 
focused, factors outside the work can be highly relevant to its 
interpretation on any given occasion.
Among the most obvious of such considerations is the skill of 
the performer. A musician may be competent to play a work to a 
standard that results in its (perhaps even faultless) performance, 
yet not be capable of bringing off all possible ways of playing 
it. Her technique might be defi cient, or it could be limitations 
in her talent, imagination, experience, nerve, or personality that 
constrain what she can achieve with the given work. Obviously, 
she would do well to recognize her boundaries and to pursue only 
those interpretations she has the ability to realize successfully. 
Also to be considered are the proclivities of the particular in-
strument that is to be played. These might recommend some in-
terpretative options and restrict others. What is interpretationally 
effective on a particular organ or harpsichord might not work so 
well on other organs or harpsichords. Even among more or less 
standardized instruments, such as the violin or pianoforte, there 
can be signifi cant differences between the instruments produced 
by different makers, and even between individual instruments. 
One can be warm sounding where another is brighter and more 
metallic. This can be relevant to deciding what interpretative se-
lections will promote the preferred overall vision of the work, or 
will be convincing and desirable at a more local level.
Another issue is the performance’s venue. An interpretation 
that succeeds in the dry acoustic of a salon might be turned to 
slush in the reverberating interior of a church. The dry acous-
tic allows the performer to highlight the piece’s intricate details, 
along with the expressive subtleties these permit, whereas the 
church musician interpreting the same work may be forced to 
emphasize its broader contours and overall mood.
In addition, whether the performance takes place as part of an 
examination, a competition, or a recital tour can affect the style 
of interpretation that is appropriate. A musician whose aim is 
to demonstrate that she meets some level of technical effi ciency 
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should highlight her handling of diffi cult passages. A competitor, 
as well as doing this, is likely to aim at an interpretation that is 
powerful and distinctive. A less exaggerated (which is not to say 
a less interesting or engaging) mode of interpretation is suitable 
for a public concert, especially if the musician is to play the same 
piece frequently over a short period.
As well, the agenda of a given performance is set by its audience. 
If the musician is playing only for herself, she can afford to be intro-
spective or eccentric. If she is playing for a large audience in a hall, 
she needs to project her account of the work. If the audience is com-
prised of school children, a straightforward, unsubtle interpretation 
would be apt, whereas a more exotic, risky, or extreme interpreta-
tion might be better appreciated by an audience of experienced lis-
teners who are already familiar with the piece. If the work is new, 
however, a conservative approach to its interpretation is wanted.
Live concerts and the recording studio lend themselves to differ-
ent stances as regards interpretation (Davies 2001, ch. 7). Intimate, 
refl ective, fastidious, and polished interpretations are better on re-
cordings. Because recordings can be repeated and are to be lived 
with, they do not readily tolerate bizarre or hypercharged interpre-
tations. By contrast, styles of interpretation that grab the audience’s 
attention and buoy them along succeed well in the live concert. 
Meanwhile rough edges, risky maneuvers, and blemishes need not 
disfi gure the live interpretation as they would the recorded one.
A further consideration concerns the work’s place in the con-
cert’s program and the other pieces with which it is surrounded. 
The fi rst piece should energize the audience while the remain-
der should progressively build the intensity of the listeners’ in-
volvement and reaction. One would expect a more over-the-top 
account of Beethoven’s Leonore No. 3 overture if it ended the con-
cert, than if it opened it. And if nineteenth-century warhorses 
fl ank Bartók’s Divertimento, it might stand out more effectively 
and provide a desirable contrast if its twentieth-century disson-
ances and rhythms are accented. By contrast, its warmth, charm, 
and melodic fl uidity deserve attention if the remainder of the 
program consists of works by Webern and Boulez.
Performance interpretations and descriptive interpretations
The musician interprets the work in performance through her 
manner of playing it. If she plans the interpretation, she might 
use trial and error, with fi nal decisions based on gut reactions 
about what comes off or feels right and what does not. She de-
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signs her interpretation on the basis of intuitions and feelings, 
without bothering to articulate the reasons behind them. And if 
it is not planned, the interpretation that emerges from the perfor-
mance is not intended as such. These facts indicate that there is 
no reason to believe the performer always will be able to give a 
verbal account of the overall vision of the work presented in her 
performance. 
The same is true of the performer’s low-level interpretative acts. 
Though these must be intended, it does not follow that they must 
be intended under a description of what they involve. If the play-
ing of musical instruments becomes automatic, then the player 
aims directly at the output without concerning herself with the 
mechanics by which she achieves it (Davies 2004b). Indeed, she 
might not be able to make the detail of her technique conscious, 
even if she tries. For instance, she might be able to impart to the 
melody a wistful nature without being sure what distinguishes 
this mode of playing from that involved in a “straight” reading of 
the tune. Moreover, she need not be able to characterize the aural 
effect that is her target as one of wistfulness. She can intend to 
produce a sound with a distinctive quality yet have no conception 
of how to provide a verbal account of what that quality is. That 
is why so much music teaching proceeds by practical demonstra-
tion coupled with grunts and hand waving.
In other words, the musician might not be able to offer a de-
scriptive interpretation that matches her performance interpre-
tation or the low-level, local interpretative acts from which her 
performance interpretation emerges. This is predictable, given 
that performance presupposes practical rather than proposi-
tional knowledge, or know-how rather than knowing that. A per-
formance interpretation shows the work in a certain light, but 
without describing it. Indeed, different performance interpreta-
tions might be equally consistent with and illustrative of a given 
descriptive interpretation of the work, and different descriptive 
interpretations might be compatible with and exemplify a single 
performance interpretation (Levinson 1996).
As was just explained, some performers might be rendered 
mute by their own playing, but that is far from the norm. Many 
can provide verbal explanations of the overall visions that guide 
their performance interpretations. And even if their overarching 
performance interpretations are not planned or intended as such, 
performers sometimes are better than others at refl ecting on 
what they have done and putting their achievements into words. 
Musicians often can supply eloquent descriptive interpretations 
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of their efforts, though this involves skills additional to or apart 
from those required to create a performance interpretation.
This also should not be surprising. Many musical works pro-
vide rich and complex possibilities for performance interpreta-
tion. Many musicians are able to exploit these to provide compell-
ing and characterful, yet personal and distinctive, readings of the 
works they play. There is much to think about, both in trying to 
understand a musical work and to devise a way of playing it that 
presents it in a plausible and interesting fashion. Though some 
of this thinking is likely to involve the aural imagination, it is 
unlikely that successful interpretation only involves mental re-
hearsal. Discursive thought inevitably plays a part in considering 
how things are to be structured or expressed, and languages have 
impressively large vocabularies with which to represent issues 
and concepts of form, action, and emotion.
As well as talent, practice, and sensitivity, good musicianship 
requires intelligence. Intelligence takes in a general aptitude for 
mental fl exibility and ordered thought that fosters and networks 
communication across a range of domains and processes. Intelli-
gent systems contrast with those made up of task-specifi c, mutu-
ally isolated modules. Though it involves many particular skills 
and aptitudes, music making is encapsulated and insulated from 
discursive thought, if ever, only among autistic and idiot savant 
musicians, and their efforts usually are striking for the untrained 
technical prowess they display, not for the insightfulness or sub-
tlety of their interpretations. Good musicians are good perform-
ing interpreters and good performing interpreters frequently can 
describe what they do and why. Musical performance and ver-
bal description involve different realms of expression, but what 
is signifi cant in the former is by no means exclusive of what is 
meaningful in the latter.7
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